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Abstract
This Article examines the procedures contained in the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(“MCA”) and finds that they are consistent with the practice of prior military tribunals, domestic
and international law, and recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The Article discusses specifically
two questions that have arisen since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rums-
feld and Congress’s subsequent passage of the MCA. First, do the procedures in the MCA com-
port with international standards? The Article considers the procedures arising from international
agreements and those used in military tribunals during and after World War II, the international
tribunals for Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court. Second, does
Congress have the authority to prescribe almost all the rules for military commissions? The con-
clusion is that both questions should be answered affirmatively.
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I. INTRODUCTION: MILITARY COMMISSIONS AS A
TRADITIONAL PROCEDURE
Military commissions reflect traditional processes and are
used by States to prosecute individuals for committing war
crimes and other grave offenses.' The military commissions con-
templated by Congress2 to try detainees' held at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, and perhaps elsewhere, are generally unremarkable.
This Article examines the procedures contained in the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA") 4 and finds that they are con-
sistent with the practice of prior military tribunals, domestic and
international law, and recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
The Article discusses specifically two questions that have arisen
since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 5
* The author is a professor of law at the United States Military Academy at West
Point and a visiting scholar at the Columbia University School of Law.
1. Sometimes referred to as "military tribunals," which represent several types of
proceedings before military courts, military commissions represent trials of individuals
accused of committing crimes against the law of war, and were prevalent in the Revolu-
tionary War, the Civil War, and World War II. See Scott L. Silliman, On Military Commis-
sions, 37 CASE W. REs. J. Irr'L L. 529, 530 (2005); see also Military Commissions Act of
2006 ("MCA"), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
2. Military commissions have jurisdiction over crimes defined by statute or the law
of war. See 10 U.S.C. § 821.
3. See id. § 950v(b) (])-(28) (listing the crimes over which military commissions
have jurisdiction).
4. See 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 948a et. seq.
5. See generally 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) (finding that military commission convened
to try Salim Ahmed Hamdan-an alleged alien combatant held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba-lacked power to proceed because it both structurally and procedurally violated
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
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and Congress's subsequent passage of the MCA.6 First, do the
procedures in the MCA comport with international standards?
The Article considers the procedures arising from international
agreements and those used in military tribunals during and after
World War II,' the international tribunals for Rwanda,8 the for-
mer Yugoslavia,9 and the International Criminal Court." Sec-
ond, does Congress have the authority to prescribe almost all the
rules for military commissions? The conclusion is that both
questions should be answered affirmatively.
The primary legal argument now available to detainees is
that the MCA or some of its provisions violate the U.S. Constitu-
tion. This argument seems unlikely to prevail because the MCA
provides procedural protections that exceed those used by mili-
tary tribunals that have been approved by the Supreme Court in
the past. In decisions from cases during and after World War II,
including Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 2 and Rasul
v. Bush,13 the Supreme Court has approved virtually every Con-
gressional enactment and rule related to military commissions.
Despite ruling against several actions of the Bush Administra-
tion, the Supreme Court has not deviated from its position, first
outlined in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 4 that the Presi-
6. The MCA was passed Oct. 17, 2006.
7. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the Prosecu-
tion and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers annex,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 284; see also Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Far East ("IMFE") art. 13, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bev-
ans 20 (as amended Apr. 26, 1946, 4 Bevans 27).
8. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc S/
RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
9. See Statute of the International Tribunal, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
10. See U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/387 (September 19, 1998) (estab-
lishing International Criminal Court); see also U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17,
1998, Final Act, 23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter ICC Stat-
ute] (establishing the International Criminal Court).
11. 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
12. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (finding that the President could not deny a citizen, an
alleged unlawful combatant, access to habeas corpus, at least in the absence of a prohi-
bition authorized by Congress).
13. See 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (finding that the President could not deny a non-
citizen, an alleged unlawful combatant, access to habeas corpus when the detainee was
held in a location over which the government exercised complete control, at least in
the absence of a prohibition authorized by Congress).
14. 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)
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dent, when acting with the approval of Congress and especially
in regard to foreign affairs and national security, possess a high
level of constitutional authority. Thus, detainees will have to
work within the procedures outlined in the MCA and will find
no additional protections in international law.
II. MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The detainees at Guantanamo Bay are subject to prosecu-
tion before military commissions because of their alleged partici-
pation in war crimes."5 In defense, the detainees might argue
that their procedural protections at trials for these crimes, at
least before military commissions, arise from customary interna-
tional law.' 6 They could rely on the practices of prior military
tribunals, international criminal tribunals, and international
agreements, such as the Geneva Conventions," v the Charter of
the United Nations, 8 the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 9 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
(approving the President's suspension of private claims emanating from a federal judi-
cial decision because Congress had implicitly approved the President's action).
15. Though prosecution of Guantanamo detainees before military commissions
may be possible, the Hamdan Court determined that the particular crime of conspiracy
was not cognizable as a law of war offense. 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2780-85 (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). The plurality concluded that only completed offenses against the law of nations
were cognizable. Id. Subsequently, however, Congress, in the MCA, made conspiracy
an offense within the jurisdiction of military commissions. 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(28)
(2006).
16. See House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Standards of Militay Commissions
and Tribunals, 110th Cong., 3 (2006) (statement of Michael P. Scharf, Professor of Law
and Director, Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity School of Law).
17. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
18. See Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3
Bevans 1153.
19. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
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Rights. ° It is likely, however, that the detainees have fewer
rights in international law than they have under the MCA.
The four Geneva Conventions provide basic humanitarian
protections to anyone as a result of armed conflict. Perhaps sim-
ilar to flexible Due Process in U.S. constitutional law,21 the pro-
tections are based on a person's status; some persons have more
protections than others. As alleged war criminals, the detainees
from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would have the fewest
rights and would depend on the fourth Geneva Convention for
their protections (Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time
of War) .22 Geneva Conventions I, II, and III, respectively, pre-
scribe rules for wounded and sick armed forces in the field;
wounded and sick armed forces at sea or who are shipwrecked;
and prisoners of war. The Guantanamo Bay detainees do not
fall within Geneva Conventions I and II because they are not
members of recognized national militias. Under Geneva Con-
vention III, the detainees could not be considered prisoners of
war because they do not possess the formal attributes of an inter-
nationally recognized fighter. To be entitled to prisoner of war
protections, an individual must: (1) fight under a recognized
commander; (2) wear a distinctive insignia or uniform; (3) carry
arms openly; and (4) fight according to the laws of war.2 3 One
primary reason for these requirements is to limit civilian casual-
ties. If soldiers cannot identify their adversaries, they cannot de-
fend themselves. Indeed, soldiers will be more likely to attack
civilians, intentionally or mistakenly, if the soldiers' adversa-
ries-unlawful combatants24 -are not wearing uniforms and are
dressed like civilians.
A government could deny a detainee the status of prisoner
of war solely because the detainee fought without a uniform.25
20. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
21. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) ("'[D]ue process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'") (citing
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
22. See generally Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 17.
23. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
24. To distinguish lawful from unlawful fighters, the Court in Quirin used the term
"unlawful combatants." 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (denying a petition to gain access to the
federal courts via habeas corpus after the petitioner was convicted by a military commis-
sion and sentenced to death).
25. See id. at 46.
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In Ex parte Quirin,2 6 a case from World War II, the U.S. Govern-
ment captured a citizen (presumably), who sympathized with
Germany and was planning to disrupt industrial operations in-
side the United States. The evidence did not show any plan to
fight outside the laws of war. Indeed, it would be legal and
proper for a soldier in uniform to do everything possible to dis-
rupt the war-making ability of an adversary, such as attacking a
factory. Yet, when captured the fighter was wearing civilian
clothes. The Supreme Court upheld the military commission's
conviction and death sentence, a traditional punishment for
spies, concluding that an unlawful combatant has no access to
civilian courts via habeas corpus because:
Unlawful combatants are . . . subject to capture and deten-
tion, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment
by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency
unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes
the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to
gather military information and communicate it to the en-
emy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes
secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of bel-
ligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the
status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law
of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.27
Similarly, in the M.C.A., Congress applied the status of "unlawful
combatant" to distinct categories of detainees:
[A] person who has engaged in hostilities or who has pur-
posefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy
Combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al
Qaeda, or associated forces); or... a person who, before, on,
or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 [enacted Oct. 17, 2006], has been deter-
mined to be an unlawful enemy Combatant by a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal estab-
lished under the authority of the President or the Secretary of
Defense.
28
A person would be an unlawful combatant if charged with one of
26. See generally id.
27. Id. at 31.
28. 10 U.S.C.S. § 948a(l)(a).
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the crimes in the Military Commissions Act, which are enumer-
ated in twenty-eight sub-sections.29
The government does not appear intent on trying detainees
for fighting without uniforms but rather for violating the laws of
war when fighting, such as killing civilians or participating in the
attacks on September 11, 2001.30 Such detainees would have ba-
sic protections under the fourth Geneva Convention, which
guarantees humane treatment, a requirement in Article 3 of
each the four Geneva Conventions. 3 ' The Conventions provide
no bar and few protections that would apply to a prosecution
before a military commission. Thus, any detainee who will be
subject to prosecution before a commission must rely on custom-
ary international law-essentially prior military commissions-as
a basis for procedural protections. However, the procedures of
the military tribunals created after World War II, such as the In-
ternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Far East, seem harsh when compared
against the standards and procedures contained in the Military
Commissions Act and could not be relied on by detainees as a
source of additional protection. At Nuremberg, for example, de-
fendants were not allowed to question the legitimacy of the
court or the seating of a judge, and hearsay, including 300,000
un-sworn "affidavits," was admitted routinely against the defend-
ants, who had no right of appeal.32
A detainee might argue that customary international law
has evolved not only from prior military tribunals but also from
the workings and decisions of the international criminal tribu-
nals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, established in 1993
and 1994. Yet, the protections emanating from those tribunals
do not exceed those contained in the Military Commissions Act.
The Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals, like the International
Criminal Court, were designed to prosecute individuals who
committed crimes within a national boundary. In contrast, mili-
tary commissions are used during and after international con-
flicts to prosecute an adversary's civilian and military leadership,
as well as other individuals of lesser culpability or prominence.
29. 10 U.S.C.S. § 950v(1)-(28)(b).
30. In Hamdan, the government's charges against the detainee were based on con-
spiracy to commit the attacks of September 11, 2001. See 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2761 (2006).
31. See Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 17, art. 4.
32. See Scharf, supra note 16, at 3.
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The international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda
focus on selective prosecutions of a relatively few individuals in a
formal, deliberative setting at The Hague, Netherlands. In con-
trast, military commissions must be capable of trying potentially
thousands of detainees at or near the place of war or within a
military setting, where a national army, as opposed to local mar-
shals, might be the only entity capable of ensuring security and
where soldiers in the armed forces will be witnesses. In uphold-
ing the convictions of Germans in a United States military tribu-
nal in China after World War II, the Supreme Court provided its
rationale as to why trials of alleged war criminals should occur in
a military setting:
To grant the writ [of habeas corpus] to these prisoners might
mean that our army must transport them across the seas for
hearing. This would require allocation for shipping space,
guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might also re-
quire transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners de-
sired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to
defend legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is held to be
a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies dur-
ing active hostilities as in the present twilight between war
and peace. Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring
aid and comfort to the enemy. They would diminish the pres-
tige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wa-
vering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective
fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies
he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account
in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention
from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at
home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litig-
iousness would be conflict between judicial and military opin-
ion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.33
Military commissions have a purpose that is very different from
the tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia.
Regrettably, the nature of war is to overwhelm and destroy
the enemy within the laws of war. The mission of a soldier is not
to find facts about whether the enemy has committed a wrongful
act. That decision has been made previously by the President or
33. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778-79 (1950) (holding that nonresident
enemy aliens imprisoned in Germany yet captured and tried by a U.S. military commis-
sion located in China had no access to the writ of habeas corpus).
2007]
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Congress. A soldier must force the enemy to submit. In con-
trast, the essence of domestic criminal law, including proceed-
ings against soldiers under the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, 34 is to find facts and, if necessary, select an appropriate dis-
position that is fair to the defendant and the government.
War is designed to be unfair to the enemy. War is not a
comparison or balancing of the rights and interests of enemy
soldiers and the government. The only governmental interest is
that of totally subduing and incapacitating enemy soldiers.
Then, only when enemy soldiers are incapacitated and treated as
prisoners of war do they acquire the right not to be killed with-
out any judicial process. Those enemy soldiers who have fought
within the laws of war are entitled to the protections guaranteed
to prisoners of war and will be released when the war ends.
Those individuals who have fought outside the laws of war are
entitled to humanitarian treatment, but they are also subject to
trial for violating the laws of war and, if convicted, they might
never be released from custody.
Thus, military commissions permit nations to maintain re-
sources, especially personnel, near the scene of battle or in a
place under military control, where the readiness of soldiers will
be less affected by a trial. By circumscribing or even eliminating
some protections that would be available at trials or in proceed-
ings within a civilian legal system, military commissions allow
soldiers to concentrate on fighting national adversaries rather
than having to spend time training how to comply with the con-
stitutional and statutory rules of criminal procedure, such as
those regarding arrest, 5 collection of evidence, 36 identifica-
tion," interrogation,3" and the exclusionary rule. 9
34. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2006).
35. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (requiring a warrant to arrest a per-
son on a felony charge in a private home).
36. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006) (concluding that the benefits of
admitting contested narcotics evidence outweighed exclusion of the evidence).
37. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (discussing procedures necessary to
ensure a fair and constitutionally proper identification procedure).
38. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (concluding that U.S. Consti-
tution, not Supreme Court rule, demands the police interrogation procedures outlined
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
39. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (concluding that evidence ob-
tained by police in violation of U.S. Constitution shall be excluded from federal trial);
see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (concluding that the exclusionary rule ap-
plies in state courts).
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The Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals attach responsibility
to individuals who committed crimes in violent circumstances
that have ended.40 The military commissions contemplated by
the United States government are part of a national security
strategy to protect a nation that has been attacked and which is
continuing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military commis-
sions allow but do not require the government to concentrate on
the most threatening individuals. Nazis at Nuremberg, Japanese
generals, and terrorist conspirators are probably more threaten-
ing to international peace and the security of nations than irreg-
ular soldiers, barbarous individuals, or informally constituted
groups in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The crimes and circum-
stances within Yugoslavia and Rwanda were grave, but those cir-
cumstances had less potential than cross-border attacks to affect
international peace and the security of nations. The focus of
military commissions has always been on prosecuting enemy
combatants who are involved in threatening the nation. Indeed,
the Military Commissions Act41 permits the prosecution of
world-wide terrorism. 42
At least for purposes of argument, one might presume that
military commissions are, indeed, needed to confront threats to
international peace that are greater than those presented at in-
ternational criminal tribunals, such as those for Rwanda and Yu-
goslavia. Under a flexible concept of due process, such as that
approved by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,43 one
could expect further, then, that the international tribunals, aris-
ing from perhaps less dangerous circumstances and occurring
after the circumstances have ended, would have greater leeway
to deliberate and would thus provide more protections than
those contained within the military commissions. But, the inter-
national tribunals do not provide more protections. The
Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals provide:
the presumption of innocence; the right to be informed
promptly and in detail of the charges and to have adequate
time and facilities to prepare a defense and to communicate
freely with counsel of choice; the right to be tried without
undue delay; the right to be present during trial and to ap-
40. See generally ICTR Statute, supra note 8; ICTY Statute, supra note 9.
41. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a et. seq.
42. Id. § 950v(b) (24).
43. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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pointment of counsel; the right to have counsel present dur-
ing questioning; the right to examine and confront witnesses;
the right against self-incrimination and not to have silence
taken into account in determining guilt; and the right to dis-
closure by the Prosecution of exculpatory evidence, and wit-
ness statements; and the right to appeal.44
While it is impossible to know how courts will interpret and ap-
ply such provisions, each protection provided by the interna-
tional military tribunals is provided also under the MCA.
4 5
In regard to appellate rights, the MCA provides significantly
more procedural protection than do the international tribunals.
The tribunals allow review by one Appeals Chamber.46 The
MCA provides detainees with three layers of review or appeal.
First, detainees may submit their convictions to the military of-
ficer who convened the commission.4 7
[T]he convening authority [officer] . . . may, in his sole dis-
cretion.., dismiss any charge or specification by setting aside
a finding of guilty thereto .. . [or] change a finding of guilty
to a charge to a finding of guilty to an offense that is a lesser
included offense of the offense stated in the charge,"48 [and/
or] "approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend the sentence
in whole or in part . .. [but] may not increase a sentence
beyond that which is found by the military commission.49
Second, if unsatisfied with the decision of the convening author-
ity, the detainee may appeal to a newly created court, the Court
of Military Commission Review.5° If unsatisfied with the disposi-
tion of the case by both the convening authority and also the
Court of Military Commission Review, the detainee may begin a
third layer of review within the civilian court system by appeal-
ing, first, to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and, second, to the U.S. Supreme Court.5'
Although the detainees are not entitled to habeas corpus
review,5 2 their right of direct appeal exceeds that of military per-
44. Scharf, supra note 16, at 4.
45. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w.
46. See generally ICTR Statute, supra note 8; ICTY Statute, supra note 9.
47. 10 U.S.C. § 950b.
48. Id. § 950b(c)(3)(A-B).
49. Id. § 950b(c) (2) (C).
50. Id. § 950f.
51. Id. § 950g.
52. Id. § 950j(a-b).
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sonnel under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and civilian
defendants in the federal courts. In the military system, service
personnel are entitled to appeal to the applicable intermediate
appellate court for the Army, Navy-Marine Corps, Air Force, or
Coast Guard. 53 They may then appeal to the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Services 54 and then to the Supreme Court.55 In
the civilian system, defendants can request review by the applica-
ble courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.56
Thus, absent review by the Supreme Court, military person-
nel are restricted to courts within the military system-the appli-
cable intermediate appellate court and the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces. In contrast, the detainees have a right of re-
view before a military commission appellate court and the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia-a military court and a
civilian court. The detainee's appellate rights serve as an addi-
tional advantage because the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, to which service personnel may appeal, is composed of
judges appointed for a term of fifteen years.57 In theory, these
judges will have less judicial independence than judges who have
lifetime tenure. In appealing to a U.S. court of appeal, the de-
tainees will appear before judges with lifetime tenure51 who will
presumably have more freedom to rule favorably for unpopular
causes or defendants, such as detainees accused of war crimes.
Moreover, while a circuit court sits initially with three judges, the
court may consider cases en banc,59 an additional avenue of re-
view that is unavailable to United States service personnel.
Finally, several prominent international agreements man-
date fundamental protections, but the protections are too broad
to have any practical effect on or applicability to a trial based on
the MCA. In essence, all the rights combined in all the interna-
tional agreements provide fewer protections than those con-
tained in the MCA. The Charter of the United Nations, adopted
in 1945, regulates the conduct of States and reaffirms generally
53. 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2000). The relevant courts are: the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals; the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals; Air Force Court of Appeals;
and the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals.
54. Id. at § 867.
55. Id. at § 867a.
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2101 (2000).
57. 10 U.S.C. § 942.
58. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (2000).
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"faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and wo-
men."6 ° The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
in 1948, mandates fundamental procedural protections in ac-
tions by a State against individuals. The Declaration guarantees
the "right to life, liberty and security of person"61 and, more spe-
cifically, "a fair and public hearing by an independent and im-
partial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obliga-
tions and of any criminal charge against him."62 When penal
sanctions are at issue, an accused person enjoys a presumption
of innocence and a public trial, along with "all the guarantees
necessary for his defence." 63 Neither the UN Charter nor the
Universal Declaration provides any relevant additional protec-
tions.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides the most specific procedural protections of the major
international agreements. The International Covenant does not
contain any reference to military commissions or tribunals but
might be instructive because some of the protections it contains
apply to trial procedures. In Article 14, the Covenant guaran-
tees: a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal; a presumption of innocence; prompt notice
of charges; adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense; a
trial without undue delay; a trial in the presence of the accused;
the assistance of counsel; the right to remain silent; and the
right of review by a higher tribunal.64 Like the international
tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (providing an Appeals
Chamber), the right of review in the International Covenant-
review by a "higher tribunal"65 -is more vague and less protec-
tive than the right of appeal contained in the MCA, which allows
three courts to review convictions arising from military commis-
sions.
In the debate over the treatment and possible trial of the
detainees, it is particularly important to note what protections
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
60. U.N. Charter, supra note 18, pmbl.
61. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19, art. 3.
62. Id. art. 10.
63. Id. art. 11(1).
64. See ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 14(1)-(7).
65. See id. art. 14(5).
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provide and, indeed, what protections it specifically disclaims.
The military commissions have provisions allowing for closure of
proceedings to protect "national security"6 6 and the "physical
safety of individuals. '67 The International Covenant contains a
provision of identical effect. It reads:
The Press and the public may be excluded from all or part of
a trial for reasons of morals, public order.. .or national secur-
ity in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private
lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly neces-
sary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.68
Unlike the Military Commissions Act, the International Cov-
enant does not provide an indigent defendant with an absolute
right to an attorney.69 Under the Covenant, the defendant does
have the right to "legal assistance of his own choosing, "70 pre-
sumably if he or she can afford an attorney. However, the Cove-
nant contemplates that an indigent person will be entitled to an
attorney only on a case-by-case basis. Under the Covenant, an
accused person has the right:
To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be in-
formed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and
to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the
interests ofjustice so require, and without payment by him in any
such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it
(emphasis added).71
Thus, an indigent accused person is entitled to an attorney only
"where the interests of justice so require." The indigent defen-
dant's provisional right to an attorney is further illustrated in the
immediate next subsection of the Covenant, which provides that
the defendant may "examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him."7 2 The need to "have witnesses examined" indicates
that the defendant might not have the legal ability or an attorney
to examine a witness.
66. 10 U.S.C. § 949d(d)(2)A.
67. Id. § 949d(d)(2)B.
68. ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 14(1).
69. 10 U.S.C. § 948k (providing indigent defendants with right to an attorney).
70. ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 14(3)(b).
71. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
72. Id. art. 14(3)(e).
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The important point is not to emphasize the procedural
limitations of prior military tribunals, recent international crimi-
nal tribunals, or international agreements, but rather to illus-
trate that the procedures contained in the MCA exceed the in-
ternational legal protections afforded to alleged war criminals-
past, present, and future. Like the U.S. Constitution, interna-
tional law provides varying procedural protections that are de-
pendent on the status of individuals, the offenses with which
they have been charged, and a consideration of the interests of
the larger community. Affording the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay and elsewhere the constitutional protections that are availa-
ble to regular criminal defendants who are citizens of the United
States would be to begin an era of jurisprudence unknown thus
far in history. International law and the international commu-
nity have never provided and international agreements have
never contemplated that enemy forces accused of violating the
laws of war would have rights equal to those of the citizens of the
nation that the enemy forces are trying mightily to destroy.
III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY OVER
MILITARY COMMISSIONS
If the procedural protections of the MCA surpass those con-
tained within international law, the detainees' only remaining
viable legal argument is that the U.S. Constitution mandates that
they receive additional protections. However, the Supreme
Court has never invalidated a Congressional rule authorizing
military commissions to exercise authority over non-citizens or
citizens.7 3 The detainees' status as "unlawful enemy combat-
73. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2759-60 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 516-18 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472-473, 485 (2004); see also
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789-90 (1950); Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1 (1946) (concluding that the Constitution and Congress's Articles of War provided
sufficient authority to deny access to habeas corpus to a non-citizen held in the Philip-
pine Islands following the surrender ofJapan and the end of the War); Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1942); accord Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 118, 131 (1866) (conclud-
ing that a habeas corpus statute prevented the President from trying a citizen in a mili-
tary commission where the civilian courts were open). In each of the cases, the Court
limited its decisions to interpreting the meaning of Congressional enactments-Articles
of War; habeas corpus statutes; and Resolutions. In Quirin and Yamashita, the Court
found that Congress could deny habeas review to a citizen and a non-citizen. However,
the Court has never squarely decided whether the Constitution provides access to
habeas review where Congress has specifically denied review, as in the Military Commis-
sions Act.
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ants," taken from the battlefield, places them in the weakest pos-
sible position when compared with virtually any criminal defen-
dant or any person protected by the Geneva Conventions. 74 The
detainees' claims are restricted further by the many specific pro-
visions in Article I of the U.S. Constitution that seem to provide
Congress with total control over rules regarding war,75 except for
the authority the President might possess as commander in chief
under Article 11.76 In the instance of the MCA, the Congress and
President have concurred as to how to treat the detainees and
are at the zenith of their authority by virtue of their agreement. 77
Article I provides Congress with the authority to "define and
punish... Offenses against the Law of Nations. '78 An example
of an offense against the law of nations would be fighting or spy-
ing in civilian clothing. 79 The result of the offense is that the
violator will be denied the status of prisoner of war under Ge-
neva Convention III,8" receive only humanitarian treatment
under Geneva Convention IV,81 and be treated as an unlawful
74. See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10-16. Congress has authority:
To define and punish Piracies and felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offenses against the Law of Nations; To declare War, grant Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To
raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be
for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and dis-
ciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed
in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia accord-
ing to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
76. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States.").
77. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the President possesses the greatest authority when Con-
gress approves his actions and the least authority when Congress disapproves).
78. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10.
79. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1942).
80. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 17, art. 4(2)(b). To receive prisoner of
war protections, a person must be under the command of a person responsible for
subordinates; have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; carry arms openly;
and conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Id. arts.
4(2) (a)-(d).
81. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, art. III.
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combatant under the MCA.8 2 Fighting with a uniform is impor-
tant so that soldiers can distinguish combatants from non-com-
batants. 83
The rule requiring a uniform is clear and unyielding. As
early as 1780, General George Washington convened a board of
senior military officers, who sentenced a British major, John An-
dre, to death after Andre was caught wearing civilian clothes and
carrying the plans for the military reservation at West Point.84
The British refused to exchange Andre for Benedict Arnold, a
former commanding general at West Point and Andre's co-con-
spirator, and General Washington allowed Andre to be hanged.
In 1942, the Supreme Court (in Quiin) allowed the execution of
a presumed citizen who was tried before a military commission
instead of a civilian court because he was engaged in espionage
inside the United States and was wearing civilian clothes instead
of a German uniform.85 Fighting without a uniform can be a
serious violation of international law because of the increased
likelihood of civilian deaths, but today States are focused also on
the greater dangers that can result from fighting with a particu-
lar animus.8 6 Thus, the international community has recognized
what are now known as genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and aggression.8 7
In cases arising from military commissions, the Supreme
Court has decided mainly only whether Congress authorized a
rule related to the commissions, not whether a rule was substan-
tively based within the Constitution. 8 In one instance, a plural-
ity addressed a substantive issue but only in the context of inter-
preting Congress's intent. In Hamdan, a plurality of fourjustices
concluded that conspiracy, as charged by the President, was not
an offense against the law of nations-or at least that the Presi-
82. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a(l)(a). For a consideration of "unlawful combatants,"
see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
83. w. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 Cmi. J. INT'L L.
493, 513-14 (2003) (discussing the concept and requirement of distinction).
84. See Silliman, supra note 1, at 530; see also David Golove, Military Tribunals, Inter-
national Law, and the Constitution: A Franckian-Madisonian Approach, 35 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L.
& POL. 363, 381 n.49 (2003).
85. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1.
86. See, e.g., ICTR Statute, supra note 8; ICTY Statute, supra note 9; ICC Statute,
supra note 10.
87. See ICC Statute, supra note 10, arts. 5(1)(a)-(d).
88. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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dent was not authorized under Article II to include conspiracy as
an offense against the law of nations.8' However, the plurality
implied, indeed virtually concluded, that Congress could make
conspiracy a violation of the laws of war. The plurality said:
"There is no suggestion that Congress has, in exercise of its con-
stitutional authority to "define and punish ... Offences against
the Law of Nations," U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, positively
identified 'conspiracy' as a war crime."90
In three primary cases decided since 2004, including
Hamdan in 2006,91 the Supreme Court heard claims by the Presi-
dent that he possessed independent authority under Article II to
issue rules for military commissions. The Supreme Court de-
cided each case based on Congressional action or silence, but in
no instance did the Court invalidate any Congressional rule or
enactment. In Hamdi, the Court found that a Congressional
Resolution, the Authorization for Use of Military Force, passed
in 2001 following the September 11 attacks, provided the Presi-
dent with the authority to hold a U.S. citizen as an unlawful com-
batant.9 2 Finding Congressional authority, the Supreme Court
did not determine the President's claim that Article II provided
him with independent authority to promulgate rules for military
commissions. In Hamdi, the Court specifically avoided overrul-
ing Quirin, a case from 1942 in which the Court approved the
trial, conviction, and death sentence of a citizen who was caught
inside the United States engaged in espionage.9" In Quifin, the
Supreme Court found that the Articles of War, drafted by Con-
gress, provided the authority for the President to try the de-
tainee before a military commission and deny him access to stat-
utory habeas corpus.94
On the same day in 2004 that it decided Hamdi, the Court
held, in Rasul, that a non-citizen detained as an unlawful com-
batant at a military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba had a statu-
tory habeas corpus right to access federal courts so long as the
government held the detainee in a place-a leased military base
89. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2784 (2006).
90. Id. at 2779.
91. See id. at 2749; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
92. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
93. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
94. See id. at 47-48.
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in Cuba-over which the government exercised "complete juris-
diction and control. '95 The Court's decision in Rasul was based
on its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), a habeas
96 ~btcorpus statute. In both Hamdi and Rasul, involving a citizen
and a non-citizen, the Supreme Court found that the President
could not limit detainees' access to federal courts so long as a
statute, at least in the Court's interpretation of the statute, pro-
vided access. However, the Court did not address whether any
detainee would have any Constitutional habeas corpus right of
access to federal courts9 7 where a statute, such as the MCA, de-
nied access.98
However, the Court did indicate that Congress might have
the authority to prohibit detainees from accessing federal courts.
In Rasul,9" the Court distinguished Eisentrager, in which a non-
citizen detainee had no right to access federal courts absent
Congressional authorization.' In Eisentrager, unlike the detain-
ees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a place over which the gov-
ernment exercises "complete jurisdiction and control" by virtue
of a lease,' 0 ' the detainee was held in another country where the
United States did not exercise such control. The Supreme
Court held that in time of war an enemy alien in that circum-
stance had no access to courts in the United States.' 0 2
The Court's holding in Hamdan1'° was dependent on its in-
terpretation of the Detainee Treatment Act,' 0 4 a statute Con-
gress enacted in 2005 to regulate the conditions of detainees'
confinement and interrogation. The Detainee Treatment Act
prohibited habeas corpus for detainees but was not clear as to
whether federal courts could continue to hear habeas petitions
pending at the time the MCA became law. In Hamdan, the
95. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
96. See id. at 473.
97. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.").
98. 10 U.S.C. § 950j.
99. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476.
100. See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
101. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
102. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777.
103. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
104. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)).
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Court held that the language in the Act could not be read to
eliminate pending habeas corpus petitions.
Following the Court's decision in Hamdan, Congress passed
the MCA,10' 5 which explicitly prohibits detainees from filing
habeas corpus petitions0 6 and effectively directs courts to dis-
miss all pending habeas actions."0 7 Congress did authorize de-
tainees to challenge their convictions in the Court of Military
Commission Review, '08 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia,1 °9 and the Supreme Court.10 To claim successfully
that Congress lacks the authority to regulate military commis-
sions to the extent it has done so in the MCA, the detainees will
have to prevail on each of several arguments:
1. that the Constitution's text does not allow Congress,
alone, to interpret when habeas corpus may be limited;
2. that Congress and the President, even when in agree-
ment, do not possess complete authority to regulate mil-
itary commissions; and
3. that the appellate review for detainees is not an accept-
able substitute for habeas corpus (if the Constitution
mandates habeas review for detainees).
Congress's authority over habeas corpus arises under Article
I, section 9, which reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebel-
lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.""' In claiming
that the text of the Constitution does not allow Congress to pro-
hibit habeas corpus, the detainees will have to argue, first, that
the Supreme Court, instead of Congress, is authorized and com-
petent to determine what is a "rebellion" or "invasion" and also
what is necessary for "public safety." In essence, the Court would
have to make military judgments about the gravity of the threat
facing the United States. At a minimum, for the Court to find
that Congress's limitations on habeas corpus were unconstitu-
tional, the Supreme Court would have to devise some method to
105. See MCA, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Star. 2600, 2601-31 (2006) (creating 10
U.S.C. §§ 948-950).
106. See id. (creating 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g)).
107. See id. (creating 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b)).
108. See id. (creating 10 U.S.C. § 950f).
109. See id. (creating 10 U.S.C. § 950g(a)).
110. See id. (creating 10 U.S.C. § 950g(d)).
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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determine that terrorism inside the United States and the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq do not constitute "invasion" and thus do
not justify limiting habeas corpus.
Of course, it also seems that with the abilities of States to
engage in modem warfare, the Supreme Court, except under
the most formalistic interpretation, could not plausibly read Arti-
cle I, section 9, to require an actual invasion before Congress
could suspend habeas corpus as part of a plan to defend the
nation. For example, intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles,
traveling over 15,000 miles per hour, can circumnavigate the
world in minutes. 12 Practically, Congress would have to have
some authority to take action, whether or not such action in-
cluded limitations on habeas corpus, before the missiles "in-
vaded" the United States' air space and destroyed the nation.
Especially in time of war when urgency and secrecy are
often essential, it is not clear how the Supreme Court could ever
possess the competence to determine when habeas corpus
should be suspended or limited. Indeed, the Constitution pro-
vides no role for the Court in matters concerning war. Article I
provides Congress with authority over all war making func-
tions"' and Article II provides the President with the authority
to prosecute wars.1 4 In essence, law, and practice, Congress cre-
ates and funds the Army,11 and the President, as Commander In
Chief, prosecutes the military actions that Congress autho-
rizes." 6 Indeed, in Application of Yamashita," 7 a case arising
after World War II-where a military commission sentenced a
Japanese general to death-the Supreme Court provided its rea-
soning as to why the general had no access to U.S. Courts:
The trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have
committed violations of the law of war is thus not only a part
of the conduct of war operating as a preventive measure
against such violations, but is an exercise of the authority
sanctioned by Congress to administer the system of military
112. U.S. Air Force, LGM-30 Minuteman III Fact Sheet, http://www.af.mil/fact-
sheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=113 (last visited Apr. 17, 2007) (reporting the U.S. Minute-
man III missile has a top speed of 15,000 miles per hour and a range of over 6000
miles).
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10-16.
114. See id. art. II, § 2.
115. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
116. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
117. Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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justice recognized by the law of war. That sanction is without
qualification as to the exercise of this authority so long as a
state of war exists-from its declaration until peace is pro-
claimed .... The war power, from which the commission
derives its existence, is not limited to victories in the field, but
carries with it the inherent power to guard against the imme-
diate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy, at least in ways
Congress has recognized, the evils which the military opera-
tions have produced . . . . We cannot say that there is no
authority to convene a commission after hostilities have en-
ded to try violations of the law of war committed before their
cessation, at least until peace has been officially recognized by
treaty or proclamation of the political branch of the Govern-
ment.118
The Court recognizes that only Congress, which determines the
parameters and time of war, has the authority to issue rules re-
garding military commissions emanating from war, or, today,
from terrorism. 19
Habeas corpus is a means to gain access to federal courts. 121
For detainees, the MCA provides a right of review by a U.S. court
of appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as an appeal to
the Court of Military Commission Review.1 2 1 The detainees' ac-
cess to both civilian and also military appellate courts prior to
Supreme Court review is unavailable to any other defendant in
the United States.1 22 The only court unavailable to detainees is a
U.S. district court,1 2 ' but access would make little practical sense.
If the detainees were confined at prisons throughout the United
States and world and had access to habeas corpus, they would
also have access to a myriad of individual judges sitting in the
district courts. For many reasons, the most important of which
would be to attend hearings to testify, detainees would have to
118. Id. at 11-12.
119. See id. at 7-10.
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (1) ("No court,justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an
alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determina-
tion."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (regarding habeas procedures for persons in state cus-
tody); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (regarding habeas procedures for persons in federal custody).
121. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 950g(a), 950g(d), 950f.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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be transported by soldiers from facilities throughout the world
to attend hearings throughout the United States.
The different district court judges could be expected to
reach different conclusions about the detainees' rights. The de-
cisions of the judges would be appealed to the different circuit
courts of appeals, whose decisions could be appealed to the Su-
preme Court. Even if all detainees were always confined at
Guantanamo Bay, similar conflicting and numerous decisions
would be issued by the various district court judges throughout
the nation who found that habeas venue could be obtained in
their courts. Even if all detainee cases were directed to the dis-
trict court in Washington, D.C., the various judges there could
be expected to issue conflicting decisions, all of which would
have to be reconciled by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia-the same court to which the detainees can appeal
their convictions under the MCA. 12 4
IV. CONCLUSION A TRADITIONAL COURT AND
EXPANSIVE PROTECTIONS
The MCA provides detainees with more substantive and pro-
cedural protections than any military commission or tribunal has
provided to any defendant in history. In World War II, the Nu-
remberg and Far East Tribunals did not even permit appeals. 125
Since then, the most significant international agreements-the
U.N. Charter, the Geneva Conventions, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights-have provided only the broadest of funda-
mental trial protections, which are relatively minimal when com-
pared with the protections contained in the MCA. Even if inter-
national law provided protections beyond those contained in the
MCA-which it does not-the detainees would be limited to
whatever protections they obtained under the Act because it
came "later-in-time" than international law and thus prevails
over earlier treaties and customary international law under the
124. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977) ("[T]he substitution of a collat-
eral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's
detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus."). Thus, even
if Congress' suspension of enemy combatants' right to habeas corpus were unconstitu-
tional, the provision in the MCA permitting appeals to federal courts would be an ac-
ceptable substitute to habeas.
125. See Sharf, supra note 16, at 3-4.
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United States' constitutional system.'" 6 No State has contem-
plated that war crimes defendants should have protections equal
to those of a nation's soldiers and citizens who sit before domes-
tic military and civilian courts. It might be nice to provide every
person in every circumstance with equal due process, but there
is nothing in law that requires it for the detainees on trial for
committing war crimes.
126. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) ("[A] Ithough treaties are rec-
ognized by our Constitution as the supreme law of the land, that status is no less true of
provisions of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default apply. We
have held 'that an Act of Congress ... is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a
statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent
of conflict renders the treaty null.'").
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